



The wage effects from the use of personal contacts as hiring channels 
 
Manos Antoninis 
Oxford Policy Management, 6 St Aldates Courtyard, 38 St Aldates, Oxford OX1 1BN and 
Research Associate, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford 
E-mail address: manos.antoninis@opml.co.uk 
 
Abstract 
It has been argued that the use of personal networks in the hiring process has a positive 
influence on the wages of referred individuals. However, the value of recommendations to 
the employer varies according to the type of vacancy to be filled and the provider of 
information on job applicants. Using data from a manufacturing firm, which combine wages 
from the personnel files and job-histories from interviews with the workers, it is shown that 
new recruits receive a higher starting wage when recommended to the job by an individual 
who has direct experience of their productivity. On the contrary, the use of referrals from 
friends and relatives has no effect on the starting wage and may even be negatively related to 
wages of workers in unskilled jobs. 
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Labor economists show a constant interest in employment settings where the wage 
determination process departs from the anonymity of spot market transactions. Such an 
example is the use of job search methods involving networks of acquaintances. Corcoran et 
al. (1980) have argued that even in the United States more than half of all employees were 
finding their jobs through their own contacts. The high proportion of vacancies filled 
through personal contacts has intrigued researchers who often view informal arrangements 
as sources of inefficiency. However, apart from the obvious benefits that job seekers derive 
from the use of networks in the form of reduced search costs (Holzer 1988, Mortensen and 
Vishwanath 1994), it has been argued that firms also stand to gain when they tap the 
networks of their own employees (e.g. Bishop 1993).  
 
Theoretical and empirical studies of employer hiring behavior have implicitly focused on the 
hiring process for skilled jobs, as the review of the literature in section 2 suggests. 
Intermediaries inform employers about unobservable characteristics of prospective 
employees that are positively correlated with their productivity and increase the probability 
of a good match. However, in practice, the use of social contacts in recruitment is more 
common in the search for unskilled jobs. In such jobs productivity differences across 
individuals are much less sensitive to observable or unobservable ability differences. 
Referred individuals, with few specific characteristics that an employer could directly link to 
an underlying productivity potential, rely on networks so that they can be differentiated 
from the anonymous group of job applicants and therefore access a job.  
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In section 3, it is argued that the value of a recommendation ￿ and the way this is reflected in 
the subsequent wage of the new recruits ￿ is not uniform across jobs but differs according to 
the type of vacancy that is to be filled and the type of person providing the information. First, 
information on applicants for skilled positions may be critical to the success of the match 
because productivity is sensitive to ability differences in these jobs, but not so for unskilled 
positions. Second, the above proposition will hold only as long as an individual with first-
hand experience of the productivity of the prospective employee, such as through common 
past work experience, provides the relevant information. There is no reason why accessing a 
job through a personal network should have any positive impact on starting wages of 
applicants when the recommendation comes from an individual with whom the applicants 
hold a family or other social tie and whose intervention might reveal a weak bargaining 
position. In fact, there might even be a negative effect on the starting wages of unskilled 
individuals accessing jobs through friends and relatives, if this intervention is implicitly 
suggestive of higher exposure to unemployment risk. 
 
It is rare that a data set combines the level of detail that is necessary to assess the impact of 
informal hiring channels on wages. This paper uses data from an Egyptian manufacturing 
firm, which brings together wage information from the personnel files and job-history 
information from interviews with the workers. It is possible to distinguish workers who 
were hired with the help of a contact. It is also possible to distinguish whether the individual 
providing the information had first-hand knowledge of the specific skills of the job seeker. 
Section 4 presents corroborating results on the effect of job and referrer characteristics on the 
initial wage. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. The function of contacts as hiring channels 
 
Unlike sociologists who were mostly interested in the implications of job seekers￿ networks 
for labor market success (Granovetter 1995, Fernandez et al. 2000), economists have sought to 
answer why employers favor the use of referrals. Apart from the conventional wisdom that 
the administrative costs of filling a vacancy are lower, the explanations put forward 
generally describe ways through which firms enhance their information. In a concise attempt 
to describe the use of contacts in recruitment, Montgomery (1991) argued that employers 
look for referrals because they believe that people tend to refer others like themselves. In a 
two-period adverse selection model of workers with two levels of ability, a firm employing a 
high ability worker in the first period is keen to ask that worker to refer one of his or her 
acquaintances. However, the model does not address the variation in rates of informal hiring 
by occupation, which is a common finding of job search method studies1. For example, Rees 
and Shultz (1970) showed that with certain occupations, such as material handlers, it is up to 
three times more likely to find a job with the help of friends and relatives, than is the case 
with accountants. The use of indirect search methods appears to differ according to the skill 
content of the job. 
 
Montgomery also ignored the diversity of motives behind the actions of referrers. Although 
it is true that employers usually seek the recommendations of their best employees when 
they want to fill a vacancy, it is questionable whether correlation of abilities across 
individual members of a network is a satisfactory assumption for all the situations that arise 
in practice. If one takes the view that ability is a multi-faceted characteristic, only few of its 
                                                     
1 Calv￿-Armengol and Johnson (2002) take note of this variation in the use of networks by occupation and predict 
that such variations will be related to other behavioral aspects of respective individuals, such as their dropout 
rate from the labor force.   4
unobserved dimensions might be relevant in a particular work environment. Moreover, one 
observes that individuals take active steps to ensure employment for members of their 
family network for reasons that are often unrelated to whether their relative has a similar 
level of ability. Employers often respond to such recommendations favorably despite their 
knowledge that they may have little to do with the new recruits￿ productivity potential. 
 
Other studies, whether theoretical or empirical, have also tended to abstract from the more 
common use of networks in daily labor market transactions and describe special cases that 
are less representative. Saloner (1985) presented a reputation argument for an employee who 
is approached by the employer seeking advice on job applicants. The referrer￿s utility is 
specified to depend on two arguments: the number of job applicants that he or she 
recommends as high-ability and are ultimately hired by the firm and the expected number of 
recommended applicants, among those hired, that are proven to be of high ability. However, 
these are considerations of a professional recruitment consultant. In informal hiring settings, 
intermediation is usually a one-off event for the referrer, who derives utility from securing a 
job for a particular individual and is not motivated by dynamic or impersonal concerns. 
There is usually a direct involvement of the referrer with both the firm (at which he or she 
often works) and the referred worker (with whom he or she possesses a very explicit social 
tie), a relationship that might test a referrer￿s loyalties. 
 
Simon and Warner (1992) used a search argument. Upon recruitment, employees give 
imperfect indications of their eventual productivity level. Recommendations by a third party 
reduce the uncertainty of employers and job applicants. Conditional on this information, 
workers employed through the refereeing system should enjoy higher initial wage, slower 
wage growth, and longer tenure on account of the better job match that is achieved on 
average. Unlike Montgomery or Saloner, they set out to test these propositions with actual   5
data. However, they used a sample of highly qualified workers from a survey of natural and 
social scientists and engineers. Such workers are active in the high skill job market where 
variance in productivities can be large and costly for firms so that referrals are critical in 
reducing employer uncertainty. Hence, their finding that hiring through contacts raises the 
initial wage should be qualified. 
 
To highlight the difference, consider a more representative cross-section of a labor market 
analyzed by Pistaferri (1999), who used household survey evidence from Italy, a country 
characterized by the strong role of family business in job allocation and high youth 
unemployment. Using a detailed set of control variables, including firm size, occupational 
and industry dummies, he found that those hired with the help of a friend or a relative 
received a wage that was lower by about 4%. This finding is important because it suggests 
that previous attempts to model hiring decisions may have taken an incomplete view of 
recruitment processes. The results may be explained by recourse to the lower productivity of 
jobs in family-based enterprises or perhaps the fact that their owners may be maximizing 
utility rather than profit. Alternatively, they may be picking up workers who were unable to 
find jobs in modern sector work environments and lower their reservation wages as a result. 
 
An analysis of referrals has to accommodate the fact that they are more commonly associated 
with low-paying occupations. A brief diversion is necessary at this point. In a recent paper, 
Kugler (2002) builds an analysis of employee referrals and their potential link to efficiency 
wages on precisely the opposite premise, namely that the use of referrals is more widespread 
in high-paying occupations. She supports this claim with evidence from the 1982 US 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth showing that the proportion of workers who got 
their job through a recommendation by incumbent workers was higher in industries that 
paid wage premia. However, this relationship is spurious and cannot refute the idea that less   6
skilled workers rely relatively more on social networks for accessing jobs. First, in the same 
results, networking activity is also higher in industries where the average education in the 
workforce is lower. Second, highly aggregated data do not control for the type of job within 
the industry, which is the main variable to look at. Third, no other related study points to 
this conclusion. On the contrary, Holzer (1996: 52-54) has argued that the importance of 
informal networks ￿appears to be relatively greater in the sectors in which fewer cognitive 
and social skills are required for work￿. Finally, recall also that the use of informal hiring 
methods is more widespread in developing countries (Ben-Porath, 1980), where the 
interaction of relatively abundant unskilled jobs with denser social relations results in a more 
frequent use of informal networks in hiring. 
 
Studies of hiring policies from the developing world are rare2. Firms in those countries 
operate in constrained conditions. For example, the low quality of education weakens the 
strength of signals sent by job seekers, thus depriving employers of an ordinary screening 
tool in hiring decisions. Entrepreneurs respond to these constraints by relying on familial, 
ethnic, professional, political, and other social networks. On the other hand, workers with a 
stable job consider it their duty to inform members of their kin or village about such 
opportunities in places where underemployment is pervasive. Early successful migrants are 
known to undertake substantial investments in organizing the reception of newcomers and 
often set them up in jobs with the same employer (e.g. Carrington et al. 1996).  
 
Singerman (1995) provides vivid descriptions of networks in Cairo, the city where the 
empirical data for this paper were collected: ￿Relatives are commonly involved in job 
searches and job placement, not only in offices but in family-owned commercial and 
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manufacturing establishments￿ (p.141). ￿Certain members of the community, who are 
known to have wide networks of acquaintances, are routinely approached by others in need 
of jobs￿ (p.147). ￿Among the poorest segment of the community, there is an expectation that 
those who are ￿ financially comfortable will help the less fortunate to find employment￿ 
(p.148)3. The main point to keep is that some motives behind referrals do not necessarily lead 
to higher wages for the beneficiaries of the networking activity.  
 
3. Hypotheses and data 
 
To sum up, previous attempts to assess the effects of informal methods of hiring on wages 
have produced contradictory results, with networks being alternatively linked to both lower 
and higher wages for the referred individual. The key to reconcile these findings lies in the 
use of a data set satisfying two properties. First, it should sufficiently identify and control for 
the skill content of jobs. Referrals can only have a positive impact on the wages of workers 
when they reduce the uncertainty of employers. There is little uncertainty in unskilled jobs, 
as even large differences in individual ability have limited impact on the output. Note, 
however, that the positive link of a recommendation to a skilled job can only be ascribed to 
the intervention of a third person that can be shown to possess direct knowledge of the 
productivity of the job seeker, such as through past common work experience, and not to the 
intervention of any acquaintance. Second, therefore, the data set should provide the identity 
of the person offering the information and distinguish professional ties from family 
relationships. Family members or friends might provide indispensable help to someone 
                                                     
3 Assaad (1997a) assessed in a meticulous study the effects of family ties on access into construction sector 
occupations in Egypt and reached the conclusion that they were playing a role in reducing barriers to entry to the 
better paying craft occupations, albeit a weak and indirect one. His research benefited from the use of nationally 
representative data. However, these would not be suited to answering the questions set out in this paper. The 
main reason is that the main variables of interest, i.e. the description of contacts and especially the wage level, 
were measured with less accuracy than in the analysis that follows.   8
looking for a first job at a low skill post. Old colleagues might provide specific information to 
an employer about the suitability of an individual for a skilled position at a later stage in 
one￿s career. The potential implications of different informal hiring channels on wages are 
examined here with a sample of 209 male production and technical workers employed at a 
manufacturing firm in Egypt4,5.  
 
Background information was collected during the course of interviews. The main question of 
interest is the method of recruitment. For the purposes of the analysis, three hiring channels 
are distinguished. First, some employees got their jobs without help from a contact: they 
were either hired on the basis of a newspaper advertisement or they inquired at the gate. 
They serve as a control group. Second, others got their jobs through a recommendation by 
individuals with whom they had worked together at some point in the past. Third, the 
remaining workers got their jobs thanks to a good word put in by a friend or a relative with 
whom there was no past history of working together. 
 
The situation is summarized graphically in Figure 1. The columns present the number of 
workers hired in each year between 1987 and 1998 (measured on the left vertical axis). The 
line shows the proportion of workers in each year that were hired through contacts 
(measured on the right vertical axis), whether these belonged in the old colleagues or the 
family/friends category. In the early years, the smaller size of the firm and the rapidly 
growing needs for workers mean that relatively more of them joined the firm without a 
referral. Later on, the employer asked workers to act as intermediaries for the filling of 
                                                     
4 The firm was established in the mid-1980s under the provisions of economic opening laws and is therefore 
private and partly owned by foreigners. It is a vertical production unit of consumer goods. For Egyptian 
standards, the technology is relatively capital intensive, the workers are relatively highly educated, and the firm 
is large, as its workforce exceeds 500 people. It is located in one of the industrial suburbs around Cairo. 
5 Single-firm studies suffer ostensibly from their limited ability to generalize their findings. Yet, they have been 
used repeatedly by labor economists to refine and test hypotheses thanks to their ability to control for a large   9
vacancies. This was partly in response to popular demand, as individuals considered lucky 
enough to possess a good job are expected to lend a helping hand toward less fortunate 
members of their immediate circle. This may be a way to improve working conditions and 
ease tensions inside the factory. It also presents a non-pecuniary benefit to incumbent 
workers who can improve their position in their networks. 
 
Information on remuneration is available from the firm￿s personnel files. All workers in the 
sample have equal number of working hours. The files record retrospectively (i.e. since the 
year of recruitment) the wages of workers employed by the firm at the time of the visit in 
2000 (although not the wages of any other worker who had been hired in the past and had 
quit in the mean time). This full set of wages would not be suited to testing the effects of 
hiring channels: the wage during a worker￿s tenure with the firm is affected increasingly by 
the employer￿s observations of the worker￿s productivity rather than by the initial 
informational content of the referral in which we are interested. Limiting the analysis to the 
sub-set of starting wages of these workers overcomes this problem. An objection may be that 
worker tenure could be systematically linked to hiring through a particular channel. In other 
words, if the sample consists of long-tenured workers hired through the recommendation of 
old colleagues (whose starting wages are, say, high) and short-tenured workers hired 
through the recommendation of friends (whose starting wages are, say, low), then the test 
would be biased. However, means tests reject the hypothesis that the length of tenure is 
systematically related to these two hiring channels. 
 
As argued earlier, we have to condition on the skill content of the job, since the employer is 
expected to pay attention to recommendations in a different way depending on whether the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
number of factors.   10
vacancy to be filled is for a skilled position or not. However, it is likely that a particular 
hiring channel is associated with the type of job, therefore any effects attributed to the hiring 
channel may actually be capturing the skill content of the job. For example, friends and 
relatives may be helping young workers get unskilled jobs only. Two groups of variables are 
used to control for such effects. 
 
First, ten indicator variables describe the job level upon entry. They are based on internal job 
titles that form the hierarchy across the three main departments of the firm (maintenance and 
two production lines). For the purposes of this study it is useful to consolidate these levels 
into two groups: four managerial and supervisory levels fall under the skilled job category 
(17% of all first jobs) and the remainder under the unskilled job category. In agreement with 
the empirical literature, the relative frequency of referrals is negatively related to the skill 
content of the job: 85% of workers in unskilled posts used contacts compared to 65% of 
workers in skilled posts6. In the regressions that follow, hiring method is interacted with the 
skill content of the vacancy. 
 
Second, the available measure of experience is more detailed than usual. Workers were 
asked to describe the various jobs they had held since graduation and their respective 
duration using an employment history calendar. Employers know whether the job applicant 
has relevant experience for a particular post and take this into account when they set the 
level of wages. The information provided by the workers on their prior experience has been 
grouped accordingly into two kinds of spells, those relevant to the job for which they were 
                                                     
6 Wahba and Zenou (2003) have studied the use of friends and relatives as a job search method in Egypt and its 
association with a measure of population density as a proxy for network size. Their analysis of the 1998 Egypt 
Labor Market Survey data confirms the existence of a negative relationship between the skill content of an 
occupation (e.g. management vs. production) and the use of contacts in accessing jobs.   11
hired and those that were not7. The rationale behind the use of this disaggregated experience 
variable is similar to that of using job level variables. Workers who were recommended by 
old colleagues have on average 8.2 years of relevant experience prior to hiring, while 
workers who were recommended by friends and relatives have only 1.3 years of relevant 
experience. Failing to control for that difference would lead us to mistakenly assign any 
positive wage effects on hiring channels when it is clearly a matter of higher specific human 
capital embodied in the recruits. 
 
There are additional controls for education in the wage regressions. Four dummy variables 
specify two types of secondary school, higher technical institutes and university education. 
Workers with less than secondary schooling are the excluded category. Each education 
variable is also interacted with experience prior to hiring. A dummy variable indicates 
workers who had worked in the firm before but had resigned in the mean time before 
returning for a second spell. Finally, there is a variable controlling for the year of hiring. 
During this period, real wages were falling until the early 1990s and increased slightly but 
steadily thereafter. In order to save on degrees of freedom, the year of hiring is specified as a 
continuous quadratic variable of time lapsed since the firm￿s first recruitments.  
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the sample. Panel A summarizes the sample 
characteristics with respect to the starting wage, the experience and the education profile of 
the workers. It further distinguishes these aspects by the main groups in terms of the skill 
level of the entry job and the type of contact used in the hiring procedure. Panel B presents 
the breakdown by the skill level of the entry job and the hiring method. Three fifths of 
                                                     
7 Parent (2000) has used a decomposition that is similar in scope, although his definition of specific experience 
was inflexible, as the worker had to remain in the same industry for the experience to count as specific. In the 
definition used here, the variable of prior relevant experience was constructed combining industry- and   12
workers were hired in unskilled positions with the intervention of a friend or relative in the 
process. It is evident that hiring in a skilled job is more commonly associated with either 
direct methods of recruitment or the recommendation of an old colleague. It is therefore 
important to control for the initial job level and the pattern of prior experience before any 




The results for the starting wage regressions are presented in Table 2. Column 1 specifies 
experience without distinguishing between spells on the basis of their relevance to the 
current job. This variable is nonetheless more accurate than the standard experience variable 
(age minus years of education minus starting age at school) because it measures actual time 
spent in the labor market. The effect of recruitment method is examined with a simple 
variable describing whether any contacts were mobilized at all in the hiring process. No 
reference is made to the skill content of the job or the source of the recommendation. Getting 
a job through the intervention of a third person appears to have no significant effect on the 
starting wage 8,9.  
 
In column 2, the recruitment method variables are presented in a format that allows a test of 
the hypothesis that both the type of job and the type of referrer matter. Indeed, a different 
picture emerges when the recruitment method is disaggregated to take into account these 
                                                                                                                                                                    
occupation-specific elements. For example, an electrician does not cease acquiring job-specific experiences when 
he or she switches industries. 
8 Among the education variables only university qualifications have a strong and significant positive effect on 
remuneration. These highly non-linear returns to education are uncommon, but they are consistent with the 
startling findings of Assaad (1997b) who showed that the returns to education in the private sector in Egypt up to 
the university level were zero. 
9 The effects of the year of hiring on starting wages (not presented in Table 2 for brevity) are consistent with the 
existing evidence on the Egyptian labor market of a rapid decline in real wages in the late 1980s and early 1990s   13
variations. The involvement of an old colleague in the hiring process has a positive effect on 
the first wage of recruits, unlike that of a friend or relative. However, the result can be 
criticized for confounding two separate influences: the skill level required for the job and the 
hiring channel. 
 
As a first step to correct this limitation, job level variables are added in column 3. Notice that 
the immediate effect is that the experience variable loses its significance. This happens 
because the returns to specific human capital are now reflected in the coefficients of job 
levels, which are not reported here for brevity. However, the findings of the previous model 
with respect to the recruitment method variables are qualitatively the same, even if the size 
of the effect is somewhat diminished. 
 
As a second step to control appropriately for the effect of skill embodied in a job, the model 
of column 4 differentiates between job spells prior to hiring that were related to the task 
currently carried out in the firm from those that were not. This distinction reveals that only 
previous spells relevant to the job to which the worker was assigned have any significantly 
positive effect on the wage received. It is also worth noting that the interaction of university 
education with labor market experience is positive in the case of job-relevant spells but 
negative in the case of spells unrelated to the job to which the individual is assigned. Having 
controlled for the level of the job seekers￿ specific human capital, we observe that there is an 
unambiguous association between the recruitment channel and the initial wage. Workers 
who got a job with the help of an individual with whom they were acquainted through some 
past work relationship earn a significantly higher wage. It is important to stress that, unlike 
usual earnings regressions, this model controls for both the position of the workers in the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(e.g. in the Employment, Wages and Hours of Work Survey). Real starting wages continued to decline in this   14
hierarchy and the level of their specific experience in great detail. A recommendation coming 
from a friend or relative has either no effect or, in the case of unskilled jobs, a significantly 
negative effect on the initial wage10. 
 
As a final check of the validity of the results, additional information was used on the 
employment status immediately prior to recruitment. About a quarter of the workers in the 
sample had been unemployed before joining the firm, however the incidence of 
unemployment was unequally spread across the three main hiring channels: workers whose 
hiring was associated with the recommendation of an old colleague were significantly less 
likely to have suffered from unemployment (10%) compared to those hired through family 
and friends (27%) or those who had used no contacts (28%). It could therefore be the case 
that the hiring channel picks up the effect of unemployment11. To control for that, the model 
of column 4 was applied only to those workers who had made a job-to-job transition. The 
main findings, presented in column 5, are not affected. A worker who used a family member 
or a friend as a contact to access an unskilled job suffers an initial wage disadvantage of 
about 14% after controlling for his job level, his specific experience and his education. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
The main argument used to explain why firms tend to resort to the networks of their 
employees when they wish to hire new workers has been their ability to reduce their 
                                                                                                                                                                    
sample until 1995, which is a little later than in the whole of the economy. 
10 Consider an extreme example of informal hiring that exerts downward pressure on wages. In quite a few 
family businesses, some (often female) household members work for little or no pay. Although one can argue that 
there is a complex mechanism of household labor supply behavior determining these outcomes (and that 
payments take in-kind forms), it is also true that some vulnerable members get a rougher deal than if they were 
unconstrained to make their labor services available to the market. However, the family link makes low wage 
offers more palatable. 
11 I am grateful to a referee for making this suggestion.   15
uncertainty about the potential productivity of newcomers. This takes place either through 
what employers perceive as an underlying positive correlation between the abilities of the 
referrer and the referred or simply because the referrer brings together the two parts in a 
way that improves the likelihood that the match is successful. Both accounts explain why 
referred individuals tend to receive higher wages, at least at the early stages of their 
employment relationship. 
 
Although there is little to disagree with in the above account, in this paper it has been argued 
that it is a partial and therefore imprecise view. Studies of job-seeking behavior suggest that 
people who use their social networks relatively more intensively to find employment are 
those looking for lower skill occupations. In a way, this is intuitive: individuals who are after 
high-skill jobs usually have their qualifications assessed objectively and verifiably when the 
prospective employer scrutinizes their curriculum vitae. Considering that productivity in 
low skill occupations is relatively less sensitive to individual ability differences, is it 
reasonable to expect that a mere recommendation to an unskilled worker￿s post is sufficient 
to affect wages positively, when even large differences in individual ability have a small 
impact on productivity? 
 
It was proposed that networks have different effects on wage and employment outcomes 
depending on their composition and the type of vacancies for which they are called for. The 
hypothesis was tested using evidence on recruitment methods from a sample of production 
and technical workers employed by a large private Egyptian manufacturing firm. The set of 
variables used in this study is comprehensive and includes individual specific experience 
and a detailed account of the job hierarchy. Wages are recorded with precision through the 
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firm￿s personnel files. It is shown that the employer will only raise the initial wage offer if the 
intermediary can verify that the job applicant possesses the skills that are sought after. This is 
the case when the referrer is someone who has worked with the job seeker before. The effect 
was positive in both low and high skill jobs, although it was only consistently significant in 
the latter case, as the theory would predict. 
 
Conversely, starting wages for those hired thanks to a helping hand by a friend or relative 
were either the same as for those who got their jobs without another person￿s intervention or 
significantly lower in the case of recruitment to unskilled jobs. This may be an indication that 
firms use the networks of their incumbent employees in order to push down the wages of job 
seekers filling unskilled vacancy slots. A larger scale survey cannot record individual 
networks with precision. Within the confines of a single firm study it is possible to map the 
links across workers and to distinguish whether they were based on kin relationships or on 
previous common work experience. 
 
The evidence was derived from a developing country setting. One might not expect the 
effects to be as strong in a developed economy. As jobs are more specialized and embody 
higher levels of technology, firms spend more to achieve a good match of workers with 
vacancies. At the same time they face fewer constraints in allocating resources and have 
more information sources to their disposal. Nevertheless, the mechanisms described here 
will still be in place and the difference will only be a matter of degree.  
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Note: Contacts include friends and relatives or old colleagues. The remaining workers were hired 
directly either through classified ads or at the gate.  
 
 Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 





















Real starting wage (in 1999 Egyptian pounds)        
Mean  2.45  4.55 2.04 1.92 3.95 
Standard  deviation  1.52  2.21 0.90 1.01 2.08 
Experience until hiring (average in years)        
Relevant to current job  3.3  8.1  2.3  1.3  8.2 
Not relevant to current job  2.8  0.8  3.2  3.0  3.1 
Total 6.1  8.9  5.5  4.3  11.3 
Education level (%)        
  1. Less than secondary (less than 12 years)  17  3  20  15  15 
  2. General/commercial/agricultural secondary (12 years)  21  3  24  26  12 
  3. Industrial secondary (12 years)  46  47  46  45  52 
  4. Higher technical (14 years)  7  6  8  7  15 
  5. University (16-17 years)  9  41  2  7  6 
Number of observations  209 36 173 136  33 
 
B. Hiring method and entry job level (%) 
 
   Initial  job  level  
   Skilled  Unskilled  Total 
Without recommendation  6  13  19 
Recommended by a relative or friend  5  60  65  Method of hiring  
Recommended by an old colleague  6  10  16 
 Total  17  83  100 
 
 Table 2. Least squares regression of the logarithm of the real starting wage 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Experience        
Experience until hiring  .0577  .0352  .0143     
  (.0190) (.0162) (.0152)     
 Squared  -.0010 -.0005 -.0000     
  (.0006) (.0006) (.0005)     
Job-relevant experience until hiring        .0467  .0632 
      (.0166)  (.0189) 
 Squared      -.0013  -.0020 
      (.0006)  (.0007) 
Job-irrelevant experience until hiring        .0134  .0221 
      (.0198)  (.0225) 
 Squared      -.0003  -.0005 
      (.0008)  (.0009) 
Interaction among experience components        .0025  .0026 
      (.0018)  (.0022) 
Education a        
General, commercial or agricultural secondary education  .0752  .0706  -.0049  .0159  .0613 
  (.1297) (.1076) (.0999) (.1067) (.1148) 
Industrial secondary education  .1885  .1539  -.0572  .0727  1452 
  (.1279) (.1063) (.0997) (.1063) (.1143) 
Technical tertiary education  .1529  .0534  -.0059  -.0030  .0912 
  (.1441) (.1202) (.1133) (.1184) (.1358) 
University  education  .7418 .5120 .1392 .3305 .5851 
  (.1536) (.1333) (.1348) (.1410) (.1700) 
Education interacted with experience       
Secondary or technical tertiary education interacted with experience  .0086  -.0016  -.0014     
  (.0110) (.0092) (.0085)     
University education interacted with experience  .0275  .0334  .0564     
  (.0157) (.0132) (.0162)     
Secondary or technical tertiary education interacted with job-relevant experience        .0002  -.0004 
      (.0082)  (.0088) 
University education interacted with relevant experience        .0512  .0517 
      (.0156)  (.0173) 
Secondary or technical tertiary education interacted with job-irrelevant experience        -.0083  -.0138 
      (.0127)  (.0139) 
University education interacted with irrelevant experience        -.2388  -.2959 
      (.0826)  (.0896) 
Initial job level (9 variables)  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Recruitment characteristics b        
Hired through recommendation  -.0846         
  (.0551)     
Hired through recommendation of  friend or relative to a skilled job    .0826  .0553  -.0217  -.0552 
   (.0963) (.1011) (.0982) (.1206) 
        old  colleague  to  a  skilled  job    .5831  .3488  .3721  .3466 
   (.0879) (.1068) (.1027) (.1168) 
                friend or relative to an unskilled job    -.2022  -.1154  -.0806  -.1400 
   (.0481) (.0492) (.0475) (.0577) 
        old  colleague  to  an  unskilled  job    .2085  .2537  .2063  .1145 
   (.0771) (.0764) (.0753) (.0865) 
Worker previously hired by the firm  .4765  .2300  .1937  .1239  -.0031 
  (.1050) (.0942) (.0880) (.0868) (.1003) 
Year of hiring (2 variables)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  .7171 1.022 1.025 1.042 1.079 
  (.1501) (.1294) (.1169) (.1188) (.1285) 
R2  .653 .762 .808 .829 .838 
N  209 209 209 209  158  c 
 
Notes:   a Base education category: less than secondary school 
 b  Base recruitment category: without recommendation 
 c  This sub-sample includes workers who made job-to-job transitions only 